SOURCE: Memo for D/DCI/NIPE from [   ] dtd 15 Oct 19__   25X1

CIRIS Comment:

6. The role of CIRIS in support of the CDIP Review should be developed and expanded.

   a) In this year's review, CIRIS was used in only a limited way for individual reference on issues large enough to fit with CIRIS categorizations. Nevertheless, the potential of CIRIS for cross-program trade-offs and for issue analysis is generally, if not unanimously, acknowledged;

   b) CIRIS in support of the review process should ultimately be able to fill several needs: for identifying, correlating and summarizing approved programs and their subsequent changes as a multi-program base for the next review; for data required for issue analysis and follow-on programming; for cross-program comparisons on a uniform, minimum-bias data foundation; for formulating and choosing among alternative options; and for isolating such costs as R&D, Support, Multi-Program expenses, etc. as parts or proportions of programs;

   c) Taken into its entirety, CIRIS offers a common structure and format for each program manager to use in developing and presenting resource proposals and for the review to use in consolidating, studying, adjusting and finally approving individual programs in the light of others and the whole of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program itself;

   d) A number of measures are possible in advancing the CIRIS "state of the art" toward support of true cross-program judgments in the next review and for several other purposes:

      1) CIRIS targeting should be on at least a twice-a-year basis, rather than the once-a-year present system. The principal input now is the January FYDP update, useful in spring and summer portions of the review cycle. What is additionally needed is an input after the Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) at the end of the CDIP Review which would

provide current data for the fall and winter. . Even better would be a system providing for an update after the PDM, after the Budget review and again after apportionment before the next cycle begins.

2) CIRIS targeting needs expansion in geographic and subject terms. This involves a substantial increase in work on data inputs and will require policy-level support to be successful.

3) CIRIS needs some clarification as to the customers and needs it should or should not try to serve. The system is now designed primarily to meet DCI and DASD(I) community or DOD-wide analyses. If and as CIRIS is integrated more closely into the CDIP Review process, program managers and service intelligence chiefs will become customers for its output, and their needs will require finer and more specialized data breakdowns than are now possible. This area of new potential needs and uses would benefit from greater discussion with a broader audience in the community.

4) As noted above, a year-round CDIP Review process would permit a continual updating of CIRIS information, putting the system into an always-ready position for support of the review and any other demands. A continuous system would also permit closer checking of data submissions for accuracy and relevance, with a progressive improvement in the whole data base.

5) Because CIRIS costs a lot in energy and dollars, there is needed a broader understanding of its uses and potential at the policy-level. Support for CIRIS costs, data, programming and equipment can come only from that policy management level.

7. One final note in regard to fiscal "fences" around intelligence: Such fences as there were this year tended to preserve institutions, organizations, levels of effort, present practices and procedures, with little reference to the substantive quotients at stake. This was a function of both the experimental nature of the review and the time

pressure on it. In the future, it is to be hoped that fences will be built for substantive ends, primarily, rather than to protect an operation able to put forward the most persuasive case for itself.

SOURCE: Memo for DASD(I) from [   ](A) dtd 8 Oct 1970   25X1

CIRIS Comment:

In order to permit the required integration of CCP resources into the Army Program Objective Memorandum, it will be necessary, in the next cycle, for the National Security Agency to develop its CCP recommendations and coordinate them with the Military Departments on a schedule which recognizes the suspense requirements placed on the Military Departments.

It is also recognized that the CIRIS was designed primarily for use at OSD level in making cross-program resource judgments and that the CIRIS may have been useful for this purpose. It is suggested that in an era of declining resources it becomes particularly important to eliminate duplicative reports. Therefore, it is recommended that a review of similar reporting systems, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency Guidance Letters or duplicative Consolidated Cryptologic Program inputs, be conducted to insure that the information requested is essential to needs of the programming system and is not duplicative of CIRIS data.

f. It is necessary to continue with the "fence" around Program 3 Intelligence and Security Resources because of the overriding considerations that (1) Army resources contribute to satisfying total DOD intelligence requirements, (2) they are closely interrelated with other resources outside of the Department of the Army, and (3) the unique roles of the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency as Program Managers can only remain viable with the establishment of such a "fence." Under this system a balanced intelligence program can be

SOURCE: Memo to DASD(I) from [   ] dtd 6 Oct 1970   25X1

CIRIS Comment:

In response to your request for comments, a general observation would be that the first completed CDIP cycle was of necessity focused on the planning and programming in the near-term period -- one or two years ahead. Most changes to programs were relatively small add-ons or drop-offs to a fixed inner core. The review apparently depended on ad-hoc techniques to produce the intelligence program, and while CIRIS data was technically available, it is not clear that it was useful at this stage in laying out long-term programs. The review still tended to be strongly oriented toward single intelligence programs rather than toward intelligence needs or outputs. For instance, my impression is that the CCP, GDIP, etc. were looked at separately with little formalized technique for coordinating these programs around intelligence outputs. Until some accepted structure (perhaps based on a CIRIS-like model) for intelligence programs which is oriented toward outputs or needs, the CDIP process will always depend on the individual program-oriented reviews and ad-hoc activities.

The CDIP review situation also suffers because we continue to have no disinterested coordinated projections of our likely future intelligence needs, the technical and political environment (including a SALT agreement) in which these needs must be met, or the uncertainties inherent in all of these.

SOURCE: Memo to DASD(I) from JCS dtd 3 October 1970

CIRIS Comment:

    c. The role of the Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) in the CDIP review. The CIRIS was initially implemented during the FY 1972-1979 PPB cycle. The defense CIRIS data bank was not constituted until mid-July 1970 which, perhaps, precluded contributing to, or influencing, the planning and programming process of the FY 1972-1979 PPBS cycle. Consideration should be given to implementing policies which will make the Defense CIRIS available to programming elements in the Departments and Defense Agencies involved in the CDIP.

    It is not possible to comment meaningfully on the role of the Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) in the CDIP review data since these data are not available for Department of the Navy review. Access to CIRIS data would be helpful to the Military Departments in the development of their CDIP programs, and therefore it is recommended that consideration be given to making these data available.

    The treatment of RDT&E and construction in the CDIP should be the subject of further detailed study. It is recognized that where these costs directly support CDIP programs there is reason to review them as part of this functional package. However, these costs also are reviewed in their own functional area contexts and the various reviews should be completely compatible. Moreover, in view of the "fence" around the CDIP, it is necessary to consider the impact that these costs, which often create intermittent peaks in the funding profile, have on the CDIP "fence". With regard to the treatment of manpower, one difficulty this year was in the pricing of Navy military manpower in the CDIP decision (PDM 70-1). The personnel were in some instances priced on the basis of endyear strengths, in others on the basis of manyears. The pricing should be consistent and, to tie to the budget process, be based on manyears.

SOURCE: Memo to DASD(I) from NRO dtd 21 Sept·1970

CIRIS Comment:

Your item "c" is difficult to comment on at this time, in the absence of output indicators or conclusions. We do know that cost inputs for CIRIS have been superseded in many cases, and have previously questioned the conclusions from TODS. Accordingly, until we have a better understanding of CIRIS outputs, we would have to vote against CIRIS as a meaningful consideration in CDIP reviews.

SOURCE: Memo to DASD(I) from Air Force dtd 6 Oct 1970

CIRIS Comment:

Comments on the role of the Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) in the CDIP review are difficult to make at this time in the absence of output indicators or conclusions. Until a better understanding of CIRIS output indicators is obtained, CIRIS should not be introduced as part of the CDIP review.

25X1

SOURCE: Memo to DASD(I) from DIA dtd 1 October 1970

CIRIS Comment:

1. Have future compilations of CIRIS data aggregated at various classification levels to permit a more complete dissemination of data to DIA functional program managers.

2. Part I, Annex A, JSOP and CIRIS be made as compatible as possible to permit resource managers to gain visibility of the resources being applied to the subobjectives of the nine major threats.

3. CIRIS inputs continue to be required for submission simultaneously with Program Objectives Memoranda.